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FIRST AMENDMENT
Does the Children's Internet Protection Act
Induce Public Libraries
to Violate the First Amendment?
by Susanna F Fischer
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 309-314. © 2003 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
By conditioning the receipt of feder-
al funding to public libraries on the
operation of filtering software on
library Internet-connected comput-
ers, does the Children's Internet
Protection Act induce public
libraries to violate the First
Amendment, thereby exceeding
Congress's power under the
Spending Clause?
FACTS
Public libraries receive federal assis-
tance for the provision of Internet
access and related services to their
patrons under two statutory pro-
grams, the E-Rate program and the
LSTA program. The E-Rate program,
under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, makes libraries eligible for
discounts of up to 90 percent on the
purchase of Internet access and
related services from telecommuni-
cations providers. 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(1)(b), 47 C.F.R. § 54.505.
The level of discounts depends on
the level of economic disadvantage
of the library as well as whether it is
located in an urban or rural area.
Susanna F. Fischer is an assistant
professor of law at The Catholic
University of America School
of Law in Washington, D.C.;
(202) 319-5568 or
fischer@law.edu.
The LSTA program, under the
Library Services and Technology
Act, provides grants to state library
administrative agencies that have
approved plans for programs using
computer network technologies. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 9133, 9134, 9141. As a
result of these federal assistance
programs, the vast majority of pub-
lic libraries in the United States now
offer Internet access, providing
library patrons with access to a
wealth of information stored on
Internet-connected computers
around the globe. However, unfil-
tered Internet access also enables
library patrons to access obscene
and pornographic materials.
In response to concerns that library
patrons, including both adults and
children, were using public library
computers to access obscene and
pornographic materials on the
Internet, Congress enacted the
Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIPA) as part of the Consolidated
(Continued on Page 310)
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DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appropriations Act of 2001. See
Pub. L.106-554, Div. B, Tit. XVII,
114 Stat. 2763A-335. CIPA, which
became effective on April 21, 2001,
includes provisions that condition
federal assistance to public libraries,
under both the E-Rate and LSTA
programs, on library operation of
"technology protection measures"
blocking all library patrons' access
to "visual depictions" that are
obscene or child pornography, and
blocking minor patrons' access to
"visual depictions" that are "harm-
ful to minors." CIPA §§ 1712 (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)
and (B)(i)) and 1721(b) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)). These provi-
sions will be referred to below as
CIPA's "library filtering provisions."
CIPA defines the term "technology
protection measure" as "a specific
technology that blocks or filters
access to visual depictions that are
obscene, ... child pornography, ... or
harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(7)(I). CIPA defines the term
"harmful to minors" as "any pic-
ture, image, graphic image file, or
other visual depiction that-(A) tak-
en as a whole and with respect to
minors, appeals to a prurient inter-
est in nudity, sex, or excretion; (B)
depicts, describes, or represents, in
a patently offensive way with
respect to what is suitable for
minors, an actual or simulated sexu-
al act or sexual contact, actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexu-
al acts, or a lewd exhibition of the
genitals; and (C) taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value as to minors."
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7)(B), 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(h)(7)(G).
CIPA contains disabling provisions
for public libraries receiving LSTA
grants as well as for those receiving
E-Rate discounts. For libraries
receiving LSTA grants, CIPA pro-
vides that "an administrator, super-
visor, or other authority may disable
a technology protection measure ...
to enable access for bona fide
research or other lawful purposes."
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3). The dis-
abling provisions for libraries receiv-
ing E-Rate discounts are very simi-
lar but are applicable to adult
patrons only. See 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(6)(D).
On March 20, 2002, a group of pub-
lic libraries, library associations,
library patrons, and Web site pub-
lishers filed suit against the United
States and others in the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, making a
facial challenge to the constitution-
ality of CIPA's filtering provisions for
public libraries. Although CIPA also
contains very similar filtering provi-
sions applicable to public schools
that receive federal grants under
Title III of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965
and federal assistance under the
E-Rate program, no challenge
was made to the school provisions
of CIPA.
Pursuant to Section 1741(a) of
CIPA, a three-judge court was con-
vened to try the case on an expedit-
ed schedule, to enable libraries to
ascertain whether they had to certi-
fy compliance with CIPA by July 1,
2002, in order to receive federal
assistance for the coming year. After
an eight-day trial, the federal dis-
trict court ruled unanimously that
the government was permanently
enjoined from enforcing CIPA's
library filtering provisions, on the
basis that these provisions required
public libraries, as state actors, to
violate the First Amendment and
were consequently facially invalid.
American Librar, Association et al.
v. United States et al., 201 F.
Supp.2d 401, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Section 1741(b) of CIPA provides
for direct appeals to the United
States Supreme Court. On June 20,
2002, the government filed an
appeal from the decision of the
three-judge federal district court.
CASE ANALYSIS
This case concerns a facial chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of con-
ditions set by Congress on the
receipt of federal assistance by pub-
lic libraries, on the basis that they
induce libraries to violate the First
Amendment. It is undisputed that
public libraries that receive funding
from local and state governments
are state actors that are subject to
the First Amendment.
The United States Constitution sets
out Congress's spending power in
Article I, § 8, el. 1, which provides
that "Congress shall have Power ...
to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States." Both
appellants and appellees agree that
the constitutional limitations on
Congress's exercise of its spending
power are set out in the Supreme
Court's decision in South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987),
which upheld a federal statute
barring states with drinking ages
under 21 from receiving federal
highway funds.
Dole enumerates four general limita-
tions on Congress's ability to impose
conditions on the receipt of federal
assistance: (1) "the exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit
of the general welfare"; (2) any con-
ditions on receipt of federal funds
must be sufficiently clear to enable
recipients "to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the conse-
quences of their participation"; (3)
any conditions on receipt of federal
funds must bear some relation to
the purpose of the federal funding
program; (4) the spending power
"may not be used to induce the
States to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 208-210. The parties
Issue No. 5
agree that only the fourth of these
constitutional limitations is at issue
in this case. Appellants contend that
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
erred in holding that CIPA's filtering
provisions violate the fourth Dole
limitation because they will induce
public libraries to violate the First
Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."
Appellees contend that the district
court ruled correctly on this issue.
Whether or not CIPA induces public
libraries to violate the First
Amendment depends on what level
of scrutiny applies to CIPA's filtering
provisions. The parties agree that
software filters are content-based
restrictions on speech, which are
generally subject to strict scrutiny.
However, appellants contend that
strict scrutiny is not the appropriate
standard for CIPA's public library fil-
tering provisions because these pro-
visions apply only to speech on gov-
ernment property. This case hinges
on the applicability of the intricate
doctrine known as "forum analysis"
that the Supreme Court has devel-
oped to determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny for content-based
regulations limiting expression on
public property. Under forum analy-
sis, there are three types of public
forums.
The first type of public forum,
known as the traditional public
forum, is public property such as
streets or parks that have
"immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public." Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
Content-based exclusions on
expression in traditional public
forums are subject to strict scrutiny,
which requires the government to
show that the regulation is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that end. See International
Society for Krishna Consciousness
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992). The second type of public
forum is called a "designated public
forum," which is a space that is
open to the public for discussion of
certain subjects or limited to certain
speakers. As long as the government
does not discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint, it is permitted to limit
a designated public forum to certain
speakers or the discussion of certain
subjects. Perry Education Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators'Assn., 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). All remaining
government property is treated
under forum analysis as nonpublic
forums, for which the government
is permitted much greater discre-
tion in limiting expressive activity;
such regulations are subject
only to "rational basis" review.
International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 679.
The parties strongly disagree about
the existence, nature, and extent of
any public forum in this case. The
government contends that the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
erred in finding that a public library
that connects its computers to the
Internet creates a designated public
forum that should be treated as
analogous to a traditional public
forum, such as a street or park,
because it is widely open to the gen-
eral public for speech on a virtually
unlimited range of topics. The gov-
ernment's primary contention is
that forum analysis is inapplicable
to this case. This contention is
founded on an analogy between the
Internet and the library's general
collection decisions. The govern-
ment argues that neither forum
analysis nor strict scrutiny applies
to a public library's general collec-
tion decisions, which are subject
only to rational basis review.
The government accepts that there
is no authority directly on point but
likens a public library's collection
decisions to other analogous situa-
tions in which the Court held that
the government had broad discre-
tion to make content-based judg-
ments in deciding what private
speech to make available to the
public. In one analogous case,
Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 672-673 (1998), the Court
found that forum analysis was inap-
plicable to a public television sta-
tion's editorial judgments about pri-
vate speech or other programming it
presents to its viewers. In a second
case, National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 523 U.S. 569 (1998),
the Court rejected forum analysis
for an arts funding program that
required the National Endowment
for the Arts (NEA) to use content-
based criteria in making funding
decisions.
Appellees accept that forum analysis
does not apply to a public library's
exercise of judgment in selecting
the material it makes available to its
patrons and concede that a library's
collection decisions for print and
other traditional materials are not
subject to strict scrutiny but rather
only to rational basis review.
However, appellees do not agree
with the government that the same
approach should apply to the provi-
sion of Internet access. A crucial
issue in this case is thus the extent
to which providing access to materi-
al on the Internet should be viewed
as analogous to the collection of
books and other traditional materi-
als by public libraries.
As a secondary contention, the gov-
ernment challenges the forum
analysis advocated by appellees and
accepted by the district court. The
government argues that if forum
analysis is found to be applicable to
a library's Internet-connected com-
puters, they should be more appro-
priately viewed as nonpublic forums
(Continued on Page 312)
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rather than designated public
forums. The government contends
that libraries do not provide Internet
connections to open up a forum for
public discourse but rather to further
the library's traditional mission of
facilitating research, learning, and
recreational pursuits.
The government uses a similar argu-
ment to contend that strict scrutiny
should not apply even if a public
library's Internet-connected com-
puters are held to be a designated
public forum. The government
argues that the designation is for
the limited purpose of facilitating
the library's traditional mission,
namely, research, learning, and
recreational pursuits. According to
the government, the appropriate
level of scrutiny for such a designat-
ed public forum should be whether
a restriction limiting expression is
reasonable in light of the limited
purposes of the designated public
forum. The government argues that
the district court found that filtering
software is a reasonably effective
means to block pornography and
that such material is not within the
bounds of a library's traditional col-
lection decisions.
Should appellees succeed in per-
suading the Court to affirm that the
government's contention that strict
scrutiny should apply, the Court will
have to assess whether strict scruti-
ny is satisfied. Both parties agree on
the test for strict scrutiny but
sharply disagree as to whether CIPA
satisfies it. To prove that CIPA's fil-
tering requirements satisfy strict
scrutiny, the government must show
that (1) they serve a compelling
government interest; (2) they are
narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest; and (3) there is no less
restrictive means to serve the com-
pelling government interest. United
States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
The government argues that public
libraries have a compelling interest
in preventing the dissemination of
obscenity, pornography, or material
that is harmful to minors and also
have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting library patrons from being
exposed to pornographic visual
depictions. The government also
contends that CIPA is narrowly tai-
lored and that any problems with
narrow tailoring that may result
from the nature of filtering technol-
ogy are cured by CIPA's disabling
conditions. Moreover, the govern-
ment argues that the filtering soft-
ware is the least restrictive means
to further the government's com-
pelling interests. The government
contends that the other alternatives
endorsed by the district court to
prevent patrons from accessing
illegal and harmful pornography
on library Internet computers, in
particular, the use of library
Internet use policies, are ineffective
when compared with filtering
software, even if filtering software
blocks some constitutionally
protected speech.
Appellees argue that CIPA's filtering
requirements do not satisfy strict
scrutiny. This argument really
hinges on how effective or ineffec-
tive filtering software, in general, is
found to be when compared to other
alternatives for blocking patrons'
access to illegal or harmful pornog-
raphy. Appellees appear to concede
that there is a compelling govern-
ment interest in preventing access
to constitutionally unprotected
speech such as obscenity and
child pornography, but they
contend that CIPA is not narrowly
tailored because filtering software is
tremendously ineffective. Appellees
charge that all types of filtering soft-
ware, no matter which brand, seri-
ously overblock constitutionally
protected speech.
Moreover, appellees contend that
there are other less restrictive alter-
natives than filtering software that
could be used by public libraries to
bar patrons' access to illegal or
harmful pornography, including the
optional use of blocking software,
enforcement of local Internet use
policies, installation of privacy
screens or recessed monitors, and
placing unblocked library comput-
ers in segregated locations or well-
trafficked library areas. Appellees
concede that none of these alterna-
tives are perfect but argue that the
government has not established that
they are too ineffective to constitute
less restrictive means than filtering
software. In addition, appellees
point out that filtering software suf-
fers from underblocking problems
that make it ineffective in prevent-
ing access to online pornography,
obscenity, and material that is
harmful to minors. Appellees also
contend that CIPA's disabling provi-
sions do not cure CIPA's constitu-
tional defects, because they do not
provide for any control over a
library's decision on whether to
disable the software, and patrons
will frequently be reluctant to
request unblocking for sites con-
cerning sensitive subjects such as
sexuality or health.
Finally, the parties strenuously dis-
pute the extent to which CIPA is an
unconstitutional condition on gov-
ernment funding to public libraries.
The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions "holds that the govern-
ment 'may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected ... free-
dom of speech' even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit." Board
of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996).
The district court did not rule on
this issue. If the Supreme Court
addresses the issue, it will need to
consider the extent to which public
libraries are protected by the First
Issue No. 5
Amendment in making decisions
about blocking software.
The parties also strongly disagree as
to the extent to which the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is
applicable to public libraries. The
government argues that the doctrine
is inapplicable to this case because
public libraries have no First
Amendment rights and thus are not
being asked to give up any constitu-
tionally protected rights. Appellees
counter that no Supreme Court
jurisprudence or lower court deci-
sions support the contention that
libraries have no First Amendment
rights. Appellees also contend that
the First Amendment does apply to
conditional funding to public
libraries whether or not the library
recipients of those funds have First
Amendment rights. They argue that
CIPA's funding condition unconstitu-
tionally restricts protected speech
in general by interfering with a pub-
lic library's professional discretion
to determine what information
should be provided to members of
the local community. In response,
the government repeats its argu-
ment that CIPA does not impose
an unconstitutional condition on
the First Amendment rights of
library patrons.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case is significant as the latest
battle in the struggle in the courts
over the extent to which Congress
can lawfully regulate content on the
Internet and in particular protect
children from obscene, pornograph-
ic, or harmful materials on the
Internet. Many people are con-
cerned about the widespread avail-
ability of pornographic material on
the Internet, but the Court has pre-
viously struck down most congres-
sional attempts to regulate content
on the Internet. The Court struck
down Congress's first attempt at
Internet content regulation, the
1996 Communications Decency Act.
See Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844
(1997). Later, portions of the 1998
Child Online Protection Act were
sent back to a lower court for
review. See Ashcroft v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S.
564 (2002).
This case will require the Court to
assess the constitutionality of a dif-
ferent type of regulation than the
direct content regulation at issue in
Reno v. ACLU and Ashcroft v.
ACLU. Instead of directly regulating
Internet content, CIPA imposes fil-
tering requirements as conditions
for public libraries' receipt of federal
assistance. No criminal penalties
apply to violations of CIPA.
Advocates of CIPA argue that its fil-
tering requirements are voluntary
because libraries do not have to
accept federal funding and are given
discretion as to what to filter. The
Supreme Court will determine
whether its generally more tolerant
approach to indirect restrictions on
speech that are tied to funding, as
opposed to constituting direct con-
tent regulation, should apply to
CIPA's Internet filtering conditions.
The Court's ruling in this case will
also be a significant assessment of
the effectiveness of software filters
as a technology to block access to
pornographic materials. Both sides
admit that filtering technology is
imperfect but disagree as to how
this impacts the technology's effec-
tiveness. Advocates of CIPA argue
that filtering technology, albeit
imperfect, is largely effective, while
opponents argue that software filters
both overblock and underblock con-
stitutionally protected speech. The
Court will have to consider whether
software filters jeopardize free
expression or whether they are an
effective way to block access to con-
stitutionally unprotected obscenity,
pornography, and material that is
harmful to minors.
Depending on the outcome of this
case, hundreds of millions of dollars
in subsidies to public libraries may
be at stake. If CIPA is upheld and
public libraries fail to comply with
its filtering provisions, they may
lose federal assistance for Internet
access and related services under
the LSTA and E-Rate programs. If
libraries in socio-economically
deprived communities fail to receive
federal assistance, they may be
forced to curtail or cut back public
Internet access. Lurking behind the
legal arguments in this case is the
significant policy question of
whether CIPA's filtering provisions
may widen the digital divide that
already exists between those who
can afford home Internet access and
those who cannot and who are more
likely to be minority and low-
income Americans. See United
States Department of Commerce
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration et al., A
Nation Online: How Americans Are
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Burdens/Standards of Proof -
As a general matter, the party in a
lawsuit asserting a claim or defense
has the burden of presenting evi-
dence that establishes the claim or
defense. This is known as the
burden of proof.
There are three burdens of
proof. From the least to the most
demanding, they are the prepon-
derance-of-the-evidence burden of
proof; the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof; and the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt burden of proof.
The first two burdens can apply in
either criminal or civil cases, while
the third applies only in criminal
cases and then only to the
prosecution.
There are no ready definitions
for these burdens. There are, how-
ever, working definitions. Under
the preponderance standard, the
party with the burden of proof is
required to come forward with
credible evidence establishing that
a claim or defense is more likely
true than not. Under the clear-and-
convincing standard, the party
with the burden of proof is expect-
ed to present evidence establishing
that the claim or defense is quite
likely true. Under the beyond-a-
reasonable doubt standard, the
prosecution must present such
evidence of the defendant's guilt
that a reasonable person would
not hesitate to find the defendant
guilty. See Victor v. Nebrctska,
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
Class Action Lawsuit As a gen-
eral rule, a class action lawsuit is
one in which one or several named
individuals sue for themselves and
others believed to have sustained
injuries or losses similar to those
sustained by the named plaintiffs,
but who, at the time the case is
filed, are unknown both as to their
identities and their actual num-
bers. In order for a plaintiffs law-
suit to be given class action status,
the named plaintiff must show that
(1) the class is so large as to make
it impracticable to specify each
and every plaintiff by name,
(2) there exist questions of law or
fact common to all members of the
plaintiff class, (3) the claims of the
named plaintiffs are representative
of the claims of the unnamed
plaintiffs, and (4) the named plain-
tiffs can fairly and adequately rep-
resent the interests of the entire
plaintiff class. (Note: Less common
is the class action lawsuit in which
the class is composed of named
and unnamed defendants or in
which both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's side of the case
constitute a class.)
Collateral review (see also habeas
corpus) - Collateral review is the
criminal law's fail-safe mechanism.
It is intended to ensure that a con-
viction and sentence satisfy the
requirements imposed by law,
constitutional and statutory. As its
name suggests, collateral review
looks at a convicted defendant's tri-
al and in some cases the sentenc-
ing proceeding; it is not, however,
a second trial. As a general rule,
collateral review is limited to
issues of law.
To be eligible for collateral
review, the petitioning party must
be in custody at the time the
process begins. Typically but not
necessarily, custody means impris-
onment. For those convicted of
state-law crimes, collateral review
is available under state law and fed-
eral law, the latter in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
As a general rule, state-law peti-
tioners must exhaust all avenues of
collateral review under state law
before filing a federal habeas
corpus petition. For federal-law
petitioners, federal habeas corpus
review is available after certain
post-conviction avenues such as a
motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence have been exhausted.
For both state-law and federal-
law petitioners, federal habeas cor-
pus review begins in a trial-level
court but in the collateral-review
context, the trial court functions as
a reviewing court. However, if the
federal habeas corpus petitioner is
unsuccessful in habeas court, he or
she is permitted, within limiting
procedural rules, to seek further
review of the habeas court's
decision in the appropriate inter-
mediate federal appeals court and
if unsuccessful there, in the
Supreme Court.
Damages - In law, damages means
money given to a party whose legal
interests have been injured. While
there are several types of damages
that can be given to an injured par-
ty, two of the most prominent
types are compensatory damages
and punitive damages.
An award of compensator
damages is a sum of money
intended to make the injured party
whole, insofar as this is possible.
An award of punitive damages is
intended to punish the wrongdoer
in order to deter future wrongdoing.
Usually, punitive damages go to the
injured party and are over and
above any award of compensatory
damages. However, in some states,
a portion of any punitive damages
award goes to the state treasury.
Direct review - In American crim-
inal law, a defendant is tried once,
but the trial itself can be reviewed
many times by many appellate
courts. One channel of review is
called direct review because it is
initiated by a first appeal as a mat-
ter of statutory right. Direct review
also is wide-ranging review because
the convicted defendant is permit-
ted to raise all procedurally proper
issues regarding the trial court's
disposition of his or her ease I
including issues of law, issues of
fact, issues concerning the trial
judge's use of discretion.
If the first appeal is resolved
against the convicted defendant,
appellate rules permit the defen-
dant to seek discretionary review
by still higher courts, generally by
the highest court of the convicting
state and then by the United States
Supreme Court. (In federal crimi-
nal cases, the convicted defendant's
initial appeal as a matter of right is
to a circuit court of appeals and
then as a matter of discretion to
the Supreme Court.) If these courts
decline to hear the defendant's
case, hear the case but decide
against the defendant, or if the
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defendant defaults on his or her
right to seek discretionary review,
the direct review process ends and
it is said that the defendant's con-
viction and sentence are final. At
this point, the only avenue of relief
from a conviction or sentence -
retrial, resentencing, or outright
release - is collateral review
defined above.
Discover. - Discovery is a
pretrial device in which each party'
to a lawsuit seeks information from
the other party as vell as from non-
parties believed to have knowledge
relevant to the issues in the case.
The plaintiff seeks information
through discovery to make his or
her case; the defendant seeks
information to support any
defenses that may be available.
Diversity - This term is used
whenever a federal court has juris-
diction over a case that does not
involve a question of federal law.
While there are several types of
diversity jurisdiction, the most
common type has two require-
ments: (1) the plaintiff and the
defendant are residents of different
states; (2) the dollar amount of the
dispute between the parties is at
least S75,Oo, exclusive of interest
and costs.
Habeas corpus - Under the feder-
al habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (1994), a person held in
state/local custody who believes
that his or her custody violates
federal law - typically, the
Constitution - may challenge that
custody by filing a petition for a
writ (i.e., an order) of habeas cor-
pus in federal district court. If the
petitioner wins, he or she must be
released or retried, at the option of
the prosecuting authority.
In bane - In bane (sometimes
spelled en bane) literally means
"full bench." The term applies to
those courts - typically, interme-
diate appellate courts - in which
more than one judge, but less than
all judges of the court, hears a
case. As a general rule, when an
appellate court sits in bane, all
active judges sit. However, in the
federal system, some circuit courts
of appeals have so many' active
judges.e e.., the Ninth Circuit
with 2" judges, that sitting literally
in bune is not feasible. Thus, for
those circuits with 15 or more
active judges, the size of an in
bane court is set by circuit rule.
Currently, in bane courts in the
Fourth, Fifth. Sixth, and Ninth
:ircuits are composed of fewer
than the entire court, with the
exact number varying by circuit
aceordinmi to circuit rule.
Per curiam opinion - This term
literally means "the opinion of the
court,' the Supreme Court or any
appellate court. Because the opinion
is the court's opinion, there is no
indication of which justice/judge
w\'rote it.
Plurality opinion - This term
denotes an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in which
there is no majority opinion, that
is, fewer than a bare majority of
five justices were able to agree on
the legal basis for the Court's
action in affirming, reversing, or
vacating a lower court decision.
In some eases, the Court's
opinion can be a partial pluralitY
opinion. A partial plurality opinion
is one in which at least one part
of the opinion represents the views
of four or fewer Justices. For an
example of a partial plurality opin-
ion, see Hubbard v. nited States,
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (Parts IV
and V, a plurality of three Justices;
Parts I, II, III, and VI, a majority of
six Justices).
Preemption - Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S C .ST. art.
VI, § 2. federal law- whether
based on the Constitution, a
statute, or a treaty' - takes prece-
dence over state or local law on the
same matter. In other words, if
federal law addresses a matter,
either expressly or by implication,
it trumps and renders unenforce-
able any state or local law on the
matter.
Qualified Immunity - Qualified
immunity is a defense that can be
raised bv a government employee
whenever there is uncertainty
about the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of certain actions taken by the
employee, actions claimed by the
plaintiff to be unlawful. A :o\'rn-
ment employee can avoid a trial
under this defense if the employee
can show that, at the time of the
complained-of action, he or she
could not have known that it
violated the law.
Strict scrutiny - Strict scrutiny is
a searching level of judicial re'iew\
applied to governmental actions
- federal, state, and local -
challenged as unconstitutional.
Strict scrutiny requires the
governmental actor to show that
it had a compelling reason to
take the challcuicd action and that
the action taken goes no further
than necessary - is narrowly
tailored - to advance the cited
compelling reason.
Sumnmary judgment - This is the
name of a procedural device avail-
able to either party' to a civil lawsuit
that enables one or the other party
to win without a trial. A party sck-
ing summary judgment is entitled to
a judgment in its favor if there is no
genuine dispute about the pertinent
facts, and, based on those undisput-
ed facts, the law compels a judgment
for the party who has asked for a
favorable nfling.
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COVERING THE COURT'S ENTIRE MARCH
CALENDAR OF CASES, INCLUDING ...
GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER ET AL.
GRATZ ET AL. V. BOLLINGER ET AL. AND PATTERSON ET AL.
The affirmative action programs at the University of Michigan's
law school and undergraduate college give racial preference
to applicants from certain minority groups. Michigan claims that
this practice is consistent with the Supreme Court's 1978 ruling
in University of California Regents v. Bakke and says that the
educational benefits derived from a diverse student body
serve a compelling governmental interest. Barbara Grutter
and Jennifer Gratz, white applicants whose credentials
would have warranted admission had they been of a
favored race, claim that Michigan's practice is contrary
to fundamental guarantees of equality.
LAWRENCE ET AL. V. TEXAS
This case involves a constitutional challenge to a
state "sodomy" law, a matter last considered by the
Supreme Court 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick.
In Bowers, the Court rejected an argument that a Georgia
sodomy law (as applied to same-sex conduct) violated
the constitutional right of privacy. In addition to asking
the Court to overrule its privacy holding in Bowers,
the two men convicted for having sex with each other
in this case argue that the Texas law unconstitutionally
discriminates against them in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee to every citizen
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